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Even though the International Criminal Court was instituted with the express goal of
ending impuniy, its lack of enforcement powers threatens to undermine its credibiliy as well as
the effective administration of international criminal justice. While proponents of the court are
content to rely on questionable means of enforcement such as militay interventions, ICC
skeptics are adamant that granting amnesties will ensure the removal of dictators from power.
But, could there be a median solution between the extremes of at-any-cost accountabilio and
outright exemplion from punishment? Game theorelic analysis of the ICC offers a glimmer of
hope for the effective enforcement of arrest warrants. A model developed by Michael Gilligan in
2006 suggests that in certain conditions the court may be self-enfordng and may have a
deterrent effect. This, as Gilligan posits, occurs because the ICC provides corrupt leaders with a
cogent but costlier exit strategy than asylum in the event of imminent regime collapse. However,
the model does not account for the fact that the ICC prosecutes leaders and opposition groups
alike and may therefore quell some opposition groups from rebelling. I develop a model of
incomplete information involving the interaction between a leader and an opposition group to
examine this effect. The results suggest that the ICC could inhibit certain opposition groups
from rebelling, thereby positive/y affecting the survival rate of corrupt regimes.
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I. INTRODUCTION
While objectionable on a number of grounds,' the Kony 2012 Campaign,2
which was recently launched by the American non-profit organization of
Invisible Children, provides a very useful illustration of the difficulties inherent
in the enforcement of International Criminal Law (ICL) and the paradox of
illegitimate justice that this creates. The campaign is intended to raise awareness
about the activities of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and its leader Joseph
Kony, an indicted Ugandan rebel wanted by the International Criminal Court
(ICC) since 2005 for crimes that include murder, rape, sexual enslavement,
pillaging, and the enlistment of child soldiers.' The ultimate objective of the
Kony 2012 Campaign is said to be ensuring the arrest of the LRA rebel leader
who evaded capture for more than six years.'
The impetus of the Kony 2012 campaign is intelligible. After all, in
approving the referral of the situation by the Government of Uganda pursuant
to Articles 13(a) and 14 of the Rome Statute,5 the Pre-Trial Chamber deemed the
intervention by the ICC necessary in light of the evident incapacity of the
Government of Uganda to arrest the LRA commanders responsible for the
gravest abuses.6 The Chamber issued the warrant to secure Kony's arrest and to
"prevent him from continuing to commit crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court."7 It was the "likelihood that failure to arrest... [Joseph Kony] will result
in the continuation of crimes of the kind described in the Prosecutor's
I Mark Kerten, Too Simple, Too Dumb.- KONY2O12's Viral Campaign Shows the Effectiveness of New
Media-And the Problem with Over-Simpifying a Message, SALON.COM (Mar. 12, 2012, 1:20 PM),
http://www.salon.com/2012/03/12/kony20l2 the-danger-of.simplicity/?utmmedium=referr
al&utmsource=pulsenews.
2 .See The Kony 2012 Campaign, Year in Review: Results, INVISIBLE CHILDREN, http://invisible
children.com/kony/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2013). The viral video developed by Invisible Children
about Joseph Kony can be accessed on: http://invisiblechildren.com/media/videos/program-
media/kony-2012/, (last visited Oct. 13, 2012).
3 Situation in Uganda, Case. No. ICC-02/04-01/05-53, Warrant of Arrest for Joseph Kony, 5
(Issued July 8, 2005, Amended Sept. 27, 2005).
4 The Kony 2012 Campaign, supra note 2.
5 Article 13(a) provides for the court's jurisdiction where "a situation in which one or more of [the
crimes referred to in article 5] appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by a
State Party in accordance with article 14." Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art.
13(a), July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1002 (1998) [hereinafter "Rome Statute']. Article 14(a) states that
where a crime within the jurisdiction of the court appears to have been committed, a State Party
may refer the situation to the ICC "requesting the Prosecutor to investigate the situation for the
purpose of determining whether one or more specific persons should be charged with the
commission of such crimes." Id. art. 14(a).
6 Situation in Uganda, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-53 1 37.
7 Id. 43.
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application"8 that led to the court's decision to issue the warrant. Yet, Kony is
still at large.
The outstanding arrest warrant against Kony is not the only case
demonstrating the inability of the court to enforce its mandate. With twenty-
three arrest warrants issued since the inception of the court in 2002, twelve
suspects still remain at large. 9 Most notably amongst the failures of the ICC to
execute its outstanding warrants is the court's inability to bring to justice the
Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir (hereinafter "Al Bashir") for whom two
arrest warrants have been issued in 2009 and 2010 for crimes committed in
Darfur in the period between 2003 and 2004 that include the crime of
Genocide."0 Enforcement of ICC warrants is evidently problematic especially
when the court's failure to secure the arrest of more than 50% of individuals
suspected of the commission of heinous crimes is compared with national
failure rates in the region of only 0.26% for violent crime." The slow pace of the
court in bringing the guilty to justice is particularly perturbing because of its
implication for the continuation of atrocities. 2
Even though the ICC was instituted "to put an end to impunity for the
perpetrators of [the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community]" and to contribute to the prevention of these crimes, 3 its lack of
enforcement powers threatens to undermine its ability to achieve its institutional
goals and to contribute to the furtherance of international criminal justice.
8 Id. 45.
9 The International Criminal Court, The Court Today Factsheet, ICC-PIDS-TCT-01-031/13 (Aug. 23,
2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/pubicatons/TheCourtTodayEng.pdf.
10 Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of Arrest
(March 4, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639078.pdf.; Prosecutor v. Omar
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Second Warrant of Arrest (July 12, 2010),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc907140.pdf.
11 UK national data on the incidents of violent crimes and the outstanding warrants of arrest
obtained from the following sources: Office for National Statistics, Focus On: Violent Crime and
Sexual Offenses 2011/2012, at 3 (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778
298904.pdf (putting offenses of violence against the person recorded by the UK police in
2011/2012 at 762, 515); Nicola Beckford, Arrest Warrants: Police Hunt More Than 30,000 Suspects,
BBC News UK (Mar. 22, 2012, 13:06 ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-17179003 (stating
that the outstanding arrest warrants for offenses of violence amounted to 2,027 from December
2011 to February 2012 in the UK).
12 Alex Whiting, In International Criminal Prosecutions, Justice Delayed Can Be Justice Delivered, 50 HARV.
INT'L. L.J. 323, 326 (2009) (arguing that a balance has to be struck between the desire for
expediency in international criminal prosecutions as justifiable as it is, and the need for time-
consuming but necessary processes); but see Jean Galbraith, The Pace of International Criminal Justice,
31 MICH. J. INT'L L. 79, 117 (2009) (determining that the ICC is much faster in its pre-custody
operation than the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (CTY)).
13 Rome Statute, supra note 5, at Preamble.
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Furthermore, by entertaining the use of alternative means of enforcement that
are particularly coercive, such as the use of military force as is advocated by the
Kony 2012 campaign, the court treads a very fine line between an arbitrary
justice and legitimacy. In an international legal order "more driven by national
interests than those of a yet ill-defined international community' [sic] values and
interests"' 4 and in which the use of power to enforce the law remains in the
hands of very few states, a consistent legal enforcement as occurs on the
municipal level is unlikely. This, coupled with the fact that insistence on
accountability leads to the uninterrupted assumption of power by individuals
wanted for the most heinous crimes against humanity, renders the hostility of
international justice enthusiasts towards the use of amnesties to ensure the
removal of political spoilers and prevention of further crimes morally
unsustainable.
Game theoretic analysis of the ICC offers a glimpse of a median solution
between the extremes of at-any-cost accountability and outright impunity. The
suggestion in an emerging International Relations literature is that the ICC
could, in certain conditions, be self-enforcing by inducing the self-surrender of
indicted leaders to the ICC.5 The most important contribution of this literature
is that it assigns a central role to "self-surrender" in the debate about the
effectiveness of the ICC regime. Bearing in mind the viability of this option,
policy makers (such as the ICC Prosecutor) can adjust their strategies to induce
it.'6 Another important input of this literature is its implicit inclusion of regime
change in the question of ICC effectiveness.'7 Integrating concerns about
14 M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Duo7 to Prosecute and/or Extradite: Aut Dedere Aut Juicare, M. Cherif
Bassiouni, ed., 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL
ENFORCEMEJT MECHANIsMs 35,36 (3d ed. 2008).
15 See, for example, Michael J. Gilligan, Is Enforcement Necessay for Effectiveness? A Model of the International
CriminalRegime, 60 INT'L ORG. 935, 937 (2006).
16 See Roza Pati, The ICC and the Case of Sudan's OmarAl Bashir: Is Plea-Bargaining a Valid Option?, 15
U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 265, 326-27 (2008) (arguing that the ICC Prosecutor should use
plea-bargaining to encourage the surrender of Al-Bashir to the ICC); Gwyneth C. McClendon,
Building the Rule of International Criminal Law." The Role of Judges and Prosecutors in the Apprehension of
War Criminals, 10 HUM. RTS. REv. 349, 366-67 (2009) (suggesting that allowing low-level officials
to plead guilty in exchange for lenient sentences will encourage further surrenders). The Trial
Chamber in Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, in its discussion of the defendant's guilty plea, acknowledges
that "An admission of guilt ... is important for the International Tribunal to encourage people to
come forth, whether already indicted or as unknown perpetrators." Prosecutor v. Erdemovic,
ICTY Case No IT-96-22-Tbis, Sentencing Judgment, 16(ii) (Mar. 5,1998).
17 Gilligan, supra note 15, at 937, 942-45. As will be discussed further in section III.B, Gilligan's
model of ICC effectiveness hinges on the probability of regime survival following the commission
of atrocities and assumes that with high probabilities of regime change, leaders will be more
inclined to surrender to the ICC in order to escape severe punishment by the opposition
following regime change.
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political transformation in post-conflict societies is essential to moving the
debate towards a broader conception of justice that includes "justice as
potentially being manifested through bringing about a fairer, less oppressive, and
less violent social and political order."18 In addition, such considerations provide
the much-required opportunity to treat the constituents of societies subject to
conflict not as inert actors who are in perpetual wait for an "international
community" to rescue them (as is depicted by the Kony 2012 Campaign) but as
active participants in shaping the future of their post-conflict societies.
The extant game theoretic literature did not take into account the fact that
the ICC, by prosecuting rebels like Joseph Kony, may discourage some rebel
groups from challenging corrupt regimes. 9 If this is the case, the court may in
fact undermine its own self-enforcing potential as well as enhance the incentives
for the commission of crimes by leaders. In addition to introducing the game
theoretic literature on the topic, the aim of this Article is to test the viability of
the hypothesis of a self-enforcing ICC in light of the institution's policy to
prosecute opposition groups as well as state actors for crimes falling under its
jurisdiction. I develop and use a game theoretic model of incomplete
information involving the interaction between a leader and an opposition (the
Model) to show that the ICC is, in certain conditions, self-defeating and may
incentivize further crimes by leaders.
The remainder of this Article includes a review of the literature on the
enforcement of international criminal law with regards to arrest warrants that
appears in Section 11. Section II is divided into three subsections: Legal
Scholarship (II.A), Game Theoretic Literature (II.B), and a Note on Regime
Change (II.C). The game theoretic model on the interaction between a leader
and an opposition group I developed in response to Gilligan's Model (the
Model) is introduced in Section II1. This Section includes five subsections on:
Motivation (III.A), Structure of the Game (III.B), Players and Their Payoffs
(IIIC), Discussion and Analysis (III.D), and Summary of Results (III.E).
Practical and policy implications of the Model are set out in Section IV followed
by a Conclusion in Section V.
is Adam Branch, Uganda's Civil War and the Politics of ICC Intervention, 21 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 179,
193 (2007).
19 This is contrary to the implicit assumption in Gilligan's model (see supra note 15) that the
probability of regime change, and consequendy the threat of opposition punishment, is
independent of the ]CC and unaffected by its operation. By positing that regime change is
determined exogenously to the model, Gilligan discounted the effect of the ICC on the behavior
of opposition groups. See Section II.B, supra at 300, for further details.
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW
The legal literature on the International Criminal Court (ICC) has either
neglected or assumed away the substantial hurdles involved in international
criminal law enforcement.2" By invoking state cooperation or humanitarian
interventions as alternative means to bring the guilty to justice, ICC proponents
seem intent on ignoring the additional problems created by these approaches. In
contrast, international justice skeptics argue that in light of this vulnerability,
there is very little justification for insisting on accountability at the risk of
prolonging the reign of aggressors. This literature is reviewed in Subsection A
below. Subsection B introduces the specialized game theoretic literature on
enforcement. In contrast to the bulk of legal scholarship on the ICC, game
theoretic analysis lends formality to the arguments for and against the court and
focuses on the impact of the court on individual incentives to commit heinous
crimes. In this particular context, this body of literature, as sparse as it is,
suggests a clear alternative to the all or nothing trend in legal scholarship.
Despite the divergent approaches to the issue of enforcement as set out
below, a consensus with respect to the need for the effective removal of political
spoilers emerges. Legal scholars agree that the legitimacy and credibility of the
ICC as well as the aims of international criminal justice in general can only be
sustained through a steady flow of successful prosecutions, which are in turn
conditional on arrests.21 As Cassese explains, allowing indicted individuals to
maintain their political power and remain free will discredit the work of
international criminal institutions.22  Furthermore, it is unlikely that
unenforceable sanctions will have a considerable deterrent effect on potential
perpetrators.23
A. Legal Scholarship
The experience of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) led a number of commentators to identify the ICC's lack of
enforcement powers as a potential bar to the regime's effectiveness even prior to
20 See Mirjan Damaska, The International Criminal Court Between Aspiration and Achievement, 14 UCLA J.
INT'L L. & FoREIGN. AFF. 19,20-21 (2009).
21 Payam Akhavan, Bgond Impunio: Can International CriminalJustice Prevent Future Atrcities?, 95 AM. J.
INT'L L. 7, 7-8 (2001); M. Cherif Bassiouni, The ICC Quo Vadis?, 4 J. INT'L CRIM.JUST. 421,426
(2006).
22 Antonio Cassese, On the Current Trends towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of
International Humanitarian Law, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 2, 16-17 (1998).
23 Michael P. Scharf, The Tools for Enforcing International Criminal Justice in the New Millennium: L essons
fvm the Yugoslavia Tribunal, 49 DEPAU1 L. REV. 925,927 (1999).
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the operation of the court.24 Cassese notes that International Criminal Tribunals
@CTs) differ from national criminal courts in that while they are saddled with
the additional burden of investigating the crimes that they need to adjudicate,
there is no separate law enforcement agency, such as the police, on which they
can depend to apprehend indicted individuals." He argues that this model of
international criminal adjudication invariably results in excessive reliance on state
cooperation that is, in turn, not always forthcoming.26 Indeed, just like the ICTY
and its sister tribunal the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),27
the ICC has its own statutory provisions detailing the obligations of states to
cooperate with the court.2 8 However, and despite assertions that state
cooperation will be the determining factor of the court's effectiveness in light of
the absence of any coercive enforcement powers at its disposal,2 9 it is widely
acknowledged that securing state cooperation is in practice very difficult and is
often hampered by political realities both in the national and international
spheres.3"
Cassese, Penrose and Scharf all cite the experience of the ICTY as evidence
that state cooperation is a perilous foundation for the effectiveness of the
international justice project.31 Cassese further identifies this dependence on state
cooperation as the "principal problem with the enforcement of international
humanitarian law" in the context of ICTs.32 The fact that no adequate remedy is
provided to compel states to cooperate with the ICC as well as the simple
political reaity that states act to promote their best interests, which rarely
24 Mary M. Penrose, Lest We Faik The Importance of Enforcement in International Criminal Law, 15 AM. U.
INT'L L. RFV. 321, 363 (1999).
25 Cassese, supra note 22, at 11.
26 Id. at 10.
27 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 29, May 25, 1993,
S.C. Res 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (hereinafter ICTY statute); International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda, art. 28, January 31, 2010, S.C. Res 995, U.N. Doc. S/RES/995 (hereinafter ICTR
statute). Article 29 of the ICTY Statute and Article 28 of the ICTR Statute respectively. For the
full text, see S.C. Res 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 attaching the ICTY statute (hereinafter the
ICTY Statute) and S.C. Res. 995, U.N. Doc S/RES/995 attaching the ICTY statute (hereinafter
the ICTR statute).
28 Rome Statute, supra note 5, at arts. 86, 89(1), & 92(1).
29 Payam Akhavan, Self-Referrals Before the International Criminal Court: Are States the Villains or the
Victims ofAtrocities?, 21 CRiM. L.F. 103 (2010) (arguing that state cooperation is more likely in cases
of self-referrals under Article 14 than otherwise).
30 Cassese, supra note 22, at 13-15; Penrose, supra note 24, at 359-63; and Scharf, supra note 23, at
978-79.
31 Cassese, supra note 22, at 13-15; Penrose, supra note 24, at 359-63; and Scharf, supra note 23, at
978-79.
32 Cassese, supra note 22, at 4.
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coincide with arresting individuals wanted by international justice bodies,
necessarily points to the conclusion that without alternative means of
enforcement the ICC will be extremely ineffective in its mandate to administer
justice." Bassiouni observes that obligations to assist ICTs are in reality rarely
complied with because there are no consequences for breaching the duty to
cooperate.34 Compelling state cooperation is itself in need of an enforcement
mechanism that is at the moment non-effectual. Even though the Rome Statute
provides for making a finding of non-compliance by the court, no consequences
of this breach of duty are detailed except for the referral of the matter to the
Assembly of State Parties or the United Nations Security Council.35 This lack of
enforcement bite is not unique to the ICC. Rather, it is a standing feature in the
enforcement of ICL.36 A case in point is the judgment of the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) in the application of the Genocide Convention between Bosnia
and Serbia. While it held that Serbia was in breach of its duties under the
Genocide Convention by failing to arrest and surrender Mladic to the ICTY, the
court was of the opinion that the finding of non-compliance was itself sufficient
to satisfy the applicant in the case and refrained from the imposition of further
sanctions.3" Damaska notes that the design of such tribunals failed to take into
account the "operational realities of criminal law enforcement.
38
Even though the 1CC reported each of Djibouti, Chad, Kenya and the
Republic of Malawi for failure to cooperate with the court in arresting Al Bashir
33 Annie Wartanian, The ICC Prosecutor's Battlefield: Combaling Atroties While Fighting for States'
Cooperation: Lessons from the U.N. Tribunals Applied to the Case of Uganda, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L., 1289,
1291-92 (2004); Penrose, supra note 24, at 363-64.
34 M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 63,66 (1996).
35 Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 87(7).
36 See ROBERT CRYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE 2, 518 (2d ed. 2010) (noting how the U.N. Security Council failed to take any action
following numerous reports of non-compliance filed by the ICTY in accordance with Rule 7 bis
of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and Evidence), ALEXANDER ZAHAR & GORAN SLUITER,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 476 (2008) (explaining that the
statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) requires the reporting of state non-
compliance to the President of the court but fails to specify actions to be taken following such
report.); Goran Sluiter, Cooperation of States with International Criminal Tribunals, in THE OXFORD
COMPANION To INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 187, 198 (Antonio Cassese ed., 2009) (citing
the proclamation of the Trial Chamber in 62 of Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14,
Judgment of (18 July 1997) that "the 'penalty' [for non-compliance] may be no more than a
finding that a State has failed in its duty to comply with an order").
37 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia & Herzegovia v. Serbia and Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 43, 229 (Feb. 26).
38 Damaska, supra note 20, at 23.
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of Sudan,39 it is far from evident that this measure resulted in any tangible action
on part of the offending states. The ineffectiveness of the ICC's attempts in this
regard may be caused by the fact that such states are probably ill-equipped to
deal with the ramifications of arresting the head of a neighboring state. In
Kenya, a high court judge issued a ruling in November of 2011 that compels the
government of Kenya to arrest Al Bashir if he sets foot in the country.'
However, the Kenyan Attorney General appealed the decision after a number of
measures were taken by the Government of Sudan to sever diplomatic relations
and economic ties with Kenya.41 The African Union (A.U.) had previously
requested the ICC to defer the arrest warrant against Al Bashir pursuant to
Article 16 of the Rome Statute, and in July 2009 called on all members not to
cooperate with the court because the request in question was not acceded to."
Jalloh argues the selectivity and double-standards employed by the ICC in its
exclusive attention to African problems is likely to result in substantial legitimacy
costs and might hamper its efforts in the continent.4 3 Other regional bodies such
as the Arab League also took a grim view of the court's efforts in Sudan and
declared a hostile stance towards the ICC in general.' In addition to the fact that
state interests may not coincide with the interests of justice, Barnes argues that
the failure of state parties to cooperate with the ICC may be the result of the
inconclusiveness of the duty to arrest in the Rome Statute.45
The difficulties inherent in compelling state cooperation led some scholars
to advocate alternative means of coercive enforcement. Scharf, for example,
advocates for compelling compliance through a myriad of coercive measures
such as the imposition of sanctions, the withholding of aid, or even the use of
39 Press Release, ICC, Pre-trial Chamber I informs the United Nations Security Council and the
Assembly of State Parties about Chad's Non-cooperation in the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Al
Bashir, ICC-CPI-20111213-PR756, (Dec. 13, 2011).
40 BBC World News, Sudan to Expel Ambassador after Kenya's Arrest Warrant, BBC.cO.UK (Nov.
29, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15932019.
41 Pamela Chepkemei, Kenya: AG to Steer Appeal after Bashir Arrest, DAIlY NATION ON THE\ WEB
(Feb. 17, 2012), http://allafrica.com/stories/201202171165.html.
42 The African Union, Decision on the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (ICC), Assembly/AU/Dec. 245(XIII) 2 (July 3, 2009).
43 Charles Chernor Jalloh, Universal Jurisdiction, Universal Prescription? A Preliminagy Assessment of the
African Union Perspective on Universal Jurisdicion, 21 CRIM. L.F. 1, 58 (2010).
44 Pati, supra note 16, at 274. See also the Resolution of the Arab League No. 464/21 dated
30/03/2009 4, 6.
45 Gwen P. Barnes, The International Criminal Court's Ineffective Enforcement Mechanisms. I he Indictment of
President OmarAl Bashir, 34 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1584,1600 (2010).
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force as is permitted under the mandate of the United Nations. 46 Even an
intransigent supporter of the ICC like Akhavan is ready to admit that the success
of the international criminal justice project hinges on the use of military,
economic, and political powers to compel states to surrender individuals wanted
by the court.4' He observes that the ICTY's experience in Bosnia was more
successful than the ICC's adventure in Sudan because the imposition of financial
and other sanctions as well as the presence of peacekeeping troops on the
ground, amongst other factors, indicated the seriousness of efforts by the
international community to see a peaceful transition.48 The dilemma is, however,
that proponents of the ICC in their appeal for enforcement go beyond financial
and diplomatic pressures and entertain, if not actively bless, the use of arbitrary
military force. Cassese, for example, maintains that "robust action by the United
Nations where required to restore international peace and security" remains
essential to the realization of international justice in the wake of conflicts.49
The recent political stalemate at the U.N. Security Council regarding the
escalating atrocities against the civilian population in Syria and the persistent
opposition of two permanent members of the council-Russia and China-to
any tangible measures against the Assad Government demonstrate the danger in
relying on an international legal system that is tempered only by political will to
affect enforcement of international criminal justice."0 While it is not possible to
institute economic and political sanctions indefinitely, l the use of military force
also has its problems. Goldsmith notes that reliance on coercive political or
military force to ensure cooperation with the court leaves the institution
46 Scharf, supra note 23, at 938-44 (discussing the merits and challenges of employing a host of
indirect enforcement mechanisms previously used in connection with the ICTY, including
economic and political sanctions, to give force to international criminal law).
47 Akhavan, supra note 21, at 30-31.
48 Payam Akhavan, Are International Criminal Tribunals a Disincentive to Peace?: Reconciling Judicial
Romantism with Political Realism, 31 HuM. RTs. Q. 624, 635 (2009).
49 Cassese, supra note 22, at 17.
50 See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution on Syria
That Would Have Threatened Sanctions, Due to Negative Votes of China, Russian Federation,
U.N. Press Release S.C./10714 (July 19, 2012), http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/
2012/sclO74.doc.htm; Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft
Resolution on Syria as Russian Federation, China Veto Text Supporting Arab League's Proposed
Peace Plan, U.N. Press Release S.C./10536 (Feb. 4, 2012), http://www.un.org/News/
Press/docs/2012/sc0536.doc.htm; Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Fails to
Adopt Draft Resolution Condemning Syria's Crackdown on Anti-Government Protestors, Owing
to Veto by Russian Federation, China, U.N. Press Release S.C./10403 (Oct. 4, 2011),
https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/ scl0403.doc.htm.
51 Scharf, supra note 23, at 942-44 (discussing the merits and challenges of using a number of
indirect enforcement mechanisms that were previously used in connection with the ICTY,
including economic and political sanctions).
Vol 14 No. 2
Bringing the Guil~y to Justice
vulnerable before hostile powerful states such as the United States. 52 More
troubling perhaps, with respect to the use of force to ensure apprehension of
individuals wanted for crimes subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC, is the
ensuing loss of legitimacy to international criminal law itself from the selective
and irregular application of this power.53 While noting the recognition by
Cassese54 of the centrality of the use of force to the effectiveness of the ICC's
regime, Broomhall criticizes similar literature on accountability for its inattention
to the conditions under which such force is to be used:
[B]ecause regular enforcement assumes impartiality in the use of force,
while in reality a carefully guarded residue of political discretion continues
to play a decisive role, one could argue that in its strongest form,
"accountability" advocacy may indirectly lend support to highly selective
and imperfect form of justice by promoting (irregular) intervention by the
Security Council or by individual States.55
To add to the above, Nzelibe points to the suggestion emanating from
political science scholarship that the prospect of international interventions in
situations of conflict may create perverse incentives in that rebel groups are
encouraged to recklessly or intentionally make civilians under their control
vulnerable to the commission of atrocities in anticipation of action by the
"international community." 6 He also notes that paradoxically such intervention
may in addition lead to acute breakdowns in negotiation and hence to the
prolongation of crises in anticipation of imminent victory by those on whose
behalf the international community intervened."
The issue of enforcement played a significant role in the "Peace vs. Justice
Debate," which is characteristic of scholarship on the effectiveness of ICTs.
This discourse pits the calls for accountability that prioritize justice
(representative of the "Accountability Camp") against those for peace and post-
conflict reconstruction that see judicial interference as disruptive and counter-
productive (representative of the "Peace Camp"). The most frequently invoked
argument by the Peace Camp is that in light of the lack of coercive enforcement
52 Jack Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 89, 89 (2003).
53 BRUCE BROOMHALL, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RULE OF LAW 61 (2003). Also note that with respect to Syria
and because it is not a signatory to the Rome Statute, the question of assistance with the
execution of a hypothetical arrest warrant for Assad remains a moot point because a UNSC
resolution referring the situation in the country to the ICC is itself not foreseeable.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 61.
56 Jide Nzeibe, Courting Genocide: The Unintended Effects of Humanitarian Intervention, 97 CAL. L. REV.
1171, 1172-75 (2009).
57 Id. at 1198-99. To the best of my knowledge, Nzelibe is the only legal work addressing this issue.
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powers and the inability to bring suspects to custody, use should be made of
more innovative approaches such as amnesties."8 Wippman, for example,
observes that unless the deterrence hypothesis often invoked in accountability
advocacy is sufficiently proven, an uncompromising quest for justice is
unreasonable." While acknowledging the challenges to enforcement,
international justice hardliners reject such approaches as incompatible with the
spirit of international criminal justice not to mention ineffective in the
attainment of sustainable peace.6" Bassiouni argues that accountability is not just
a prerequisite of deterrence, but also an important factor in securing a stable
post-conflict society and a lasting peace.6 The difficulty in this assertion,
however, is that there is very little evidence to suggest that ICTs contribute to
post conflict peace or indeed to deterrence. 2 Even though a number of
empirical attempts were made to verify the deterrence hypothesis of
prosecutions, the limited data available as well as the ideological impasse
between supporters and opponents prevented any serious dialogue on the issue.
63 Still, if the goals of the international criminal justice regime include deterrence,
not just in the limited form of general deterrence, but as requiring the
prevention of atrocities as well as the incapacitation and removal of political
spoilers,64 it could be argued that a dogged adherence to the notion of
accountability may prove counterproductive.
58 Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors: Prineple and Pragmatism in Strategies of International
Justice, 28 INT'L SECURITY 5, 5-6 (2004).
59 David Wippman, Atroities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International Justice, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
473, 473-75 (1999).
60 See, for example, M. Cherif Bassiouni, Combating Impunity for International Crimes, 71 U. COLO. L. REV.
409, 409-10 (2000).
61 Id. at 410.
62 Dwight G. Newman, The Rome Statute, Some Reservations Concerning Amnesties, and a Distributive
Problem, 20 AM. U. INT'l. L. REV. 293, 354-55 (2004); Snyder & Vinjamuri, supra note 58, at 43-44.
But see Hunjoon Kim & Kathryn Sikkink, Explaining the Deterrence Effect of Human Ri'ghts Prosecutions
for Transitional Countries, 54 INT'L STUD. Q. 939, 956-57 (2010) (employing data from 100
transitional countries to show that prosecutions of human rights abuses decrease oppression).
63 Kim & Sikkink, supra note 62, at 957-58 (concluding that human rights prosecutions after
atrocities lead to better human rights protection and generate a deterrent effect beyond the
confines of a single country); Tricia D. Olsen, Leigh A. Payne, & Andrew G. Reiter, The Justice
Balance: When Transitional Justice Improves Human Ragbts and Democray, 32 HuM. RTs. Q. 980, 980-
1007 (2010) (demonstrating that prosecutions of gross human tights violations alone have no
significant effect on democracy and the protection of human tights and that only a combination
of trials and amnesties or trials, amnesties, and truth commissions works); Abel EscibA-Folch &
Joseph Wright, Human Rights Prosecutions and Autocratic Survival, 31-32 (May 1, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.personal.psu.edu/jgw12/blogs/josephwright/THRP7.pdf
(showing that human rights prosecutions in neighboring countries have a negative effect on
democratic transitions in countries where personalist dictators are in power).
64 Akhavan, supra note 21, at 12-13.
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Despite the substantial enforcement dilemma faced by ICTs, traditional
scholarship in the field treats the issue either as a separate question of a wavering
political will to bring about justice, ignores it completely, or otherwise
circumvents it by rejecting the need for international justice. This trend is
particularly troubling because it seems to mirror the general schism in
international criminal justice literature between the drastically opposed
ideological strands of realism and idealism, both of which failed to provide any
convincing arguments for or against the effectiveness of international criminal
prosecutions." This polarization results in approaches to enforcement that either
seek to have justice at any cost or are content not to pursue justice at all.
B. Game-Theoretic Literature
The 1CC enforcement dilemma attracted the attention of a number of
international relations scholars who attempted to understand the potential of the
current international criminal regime within a broader research framework
seeking to answer questions about the function of international organizations.66
Using the tools of game theory to formulate propositions about the possible
effects of the ICC on the behavior of regime leaders, a limited scholarship
emerged to lend a much-needed formalization to existing arguments in the
field.67
The use of game theory in the analysis of law enforcement problems is not
new and indeed owes its use of the basic concept of cost-benefit calculation to
Becker's seminal essay on crime and punishment.68 This idea, which informs the
economic analysis of law (the field of law and economics or L&E), allows one to
judge the effectiveness of a rule or law by looking at the way it affects
individuals' cost-benefit calculus and the incentives or disincentives it provides
them for committing or refraining from committing a certain act.69 For example,
it is a generally accepted principle of contemporary jurisprudence that evidence
obtained as a result of torture must have no weight in a court of law. By
legislating to create this rule, lawmakers assign a zero value to evidence obtained
this way. This has the effect of offsetting any expected benefit from employing
unorthodox means in law enforcement. Because obtaining evidence through the
65 Fr~dric M~gret, 1hree Dangers for the International Criminal Court. A Critical Look at a Consensual
Project, 12 FINNISH Y.B. INT'L L. 193, 193-99 (2001).
66 Michael J. Gilligan & Leslie Johns, Formal Models of International Institutions, 15 ANN. REV. POLIT.
Sc. 221, 222 (2012).
67 See Gilligan, supra note 15, at 941.
68 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POLIT. ECONOMY 169 (1968).
69 KAUSHIK BASU, BEYOND THE INVISIBLE HAND: GROUNDWORK FOR A NEW ECONOMICs 71-76
(2011).
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use of torture will not result in a conviction and might in fact result in an
acquittal of a guilty defendant, a change in the law to that effect negates the
incentive to use torture in the first place.
Game theory is particularly well suited to situations that involve
interactions between two or more decision makers. Law enforcement in general,
and in the context of international criminal justice in particular, often involves
the action of multiple agents. In the international criminal justice context, the
cost-benefit calculus of corrupt leaders is affected by what the ICCv° does as well
as what it is likely to do in a given situation. A leader's behavior may also be
affected by the decisions of third-party states or the actions of a relevant
opposition or rebel group. Hviid notes:
[G]ame theory allows us to contrast a myopic view of what is a good legal
reform with a more sophisticated view, where each actor's optimal response
to the new set of rules is taken into consideration when evaluating the
proposed change. By clarifying the likely effects of different changes a more
informed (political or legal) decision can be taken.71
It is therefore unsurprising that the ICC enforcement dilemma provides a ripe
field for the application of game theory.
Using a traditional economic of crimes model, Sutter developed a modest
analysis of the ICC suggesting that for the court to have more than a marginal
deterrent effect, it must be, but is not, better placed to apprehend leaders who
are still in power 2.7  He pointed out the possibility that leaders who already
committed crimes will likely cling to power and speculated that divergent
interests within a certain regime may lead to a more beneficial interaction with
the ICC.73 Gilligan, on the other hand, introduced a sophisticated repeated game
model to study the effect of the ICC on a dictator's decision to commit atrocities
in light of the willingness of a third-party state to offer him asylum (Gilligan's
Model).74 Gilligan's Model suggests that the ICC is likely to have a deterrent
effect on the margin, because it will allow third-party states to credibly decline
offering some dictators asylum knowing that surrendering to the ICC provides
them with an alternative exit strategy.
70 For purposes of this Article, I assume that the ICC is a unitary actor represented by the ICC
Prosecutor. Even though the actions of individual players within the ICC may be of relevance to
the effectiveness of law enforcement efforts, see, for example, McClendon supra note 16, at 366-70,
the focus of the Article is on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
71 Morton Hviid, Games Lawyers Play?, 17 OxFoRDJ. LEGAL STUD. 705, 724 (1997).
72 Daniel Sutter, The Deterrent Effects of the International Criminal Court, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 9, 11-19 (Stefan Voigt, et. al. eds., 2006).
73 Id.
74 Gilligan, supra note 15, at 942-51.
Vol. 14 No. 2
Bringing the Guilty to Justice
Gilligan's Model rests on the assumption that leaders face harsher
punishments domestically than at the hands of the ICC. This is not an
unreasonable assumption. The fate of Muammar Gaddhafi following the
successful popular uprising in Libya in 2011 is illustrative of the point.
7 5
Furthermore, Ku and Nzelibe show that in most cases, political leaders face very
severe domestic punishments in the wake of a coup. 76 By contrast, Article 77(1)
of the Rome Statute limits the ability of the court to impose a prison sentence in
excess of 30 years.77 By imposing weaker sanctions, Gilligan maintains, the ICC
allows a leader who committed crimes the option of surrendering to the court
instead of clinging to power as predicted by Sutter. He argues that the creation
of the ICC acts as a third mid-way option between receiving asylum at zero cost
and being overthrown at a very high cost. When a state refuses to grant asylum
to a leader sufficiently threatened with a coup or regime change, he will be
forced to surrender to the ICC and receive the 30-year sentence. Gilligan
observes that under these conditions, the ICC's effect is not to make leaders
cling to power but rather to make them surrender to the ICC when this option is
better for them than to take chances of being overthrown and severely punished.
And because surrender to the ICC in these situations entails some positive
punishment compared to the zero cost of asylum, the overall effect of the 1CC is
in fact to make crimes costlier for a leader (See Figure 1).
75 Death of a Dictator, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Oct. 17, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/node/
110724/section/2.
76 Julian Ku & Jide Nzelibe, Do International Criminal Tribunals Deter or Exacerbate Humanitarian
Atrodties, 84 WASH. U. L. RiEv. 777, 832 (2006).
77 The text of Article 77(1) of the Rome Statute, supra note 5, states:
Subject to article 110, the court may impose one of the following penalties on
a person convicted of a crime referred to in article 5 of this Statute:
(a) Imprisonment for a specific number of years, which may not exceed a
maximum of 30 years; or
(b) A term of life imprisonment when justified by the extreme gravity of the
crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person.
Even though the court was given the power to impose a life sentence in some circumstances as a
compromise on the issue of the exclusion of capital punishment, the same is fettered by a
threshold of extreme gravity the determination of which is likely to be problematic if it arises.
Schabas argues that the international trend to outlaw the death penalty was also accompanied by a
general aversion to the use of life sentences during the negotiations leading up to adopting the
text of the Rome Statute. William A. Schabas, Life, Death and the Crime of Crimes. Supreme Penalties
and the ICC Statute, 2 PUNISHMiENT & SOc'Y 263, 266 (2000).
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Figure 1
Gilligan's Cost of Crime Logic
In Gilligan's Model, the decision of the leader to exit power depends on
the probability of his survival in office. When this probability is low enough, the
leader will be willing to surrender to the ICC despite the promise of punishment.
With higher probabilities of survival, the leader will prefer the better option of
asylum, which the benevolent third-party state would oblige. It is important to
note that Gilligan posits that the ICC will deter the proportion of leaders who
would have been granted asylum if not for the ICC. However, when the regime
is very likely to survive, neither the ICC nor asylum will be attractive enough.
Recent events in Syria demonstrate this logic. With the onslaught by government
forces against civilian populations continuing unabated and the persistent
political impasse on international intervention, Tunisia extended an offer of
asylum to the Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad."8 Tunisia's invitation is neither
surprising nor uncommon given the numerous incidents of often well-
intentioned states offering their territories as safe haven for tyrants.79 Indeed,
Tunisia itself had witnessed a popular revolution in 2011 that inspired a series of
demonstrations for political change across the Arab World and which in turn
became a catalyst for the Syrian revolution. Tunisia was also the first country to
withdraw its ambassador from Syria in protest over the military operations
against Syrian demonstrators. It is, hence, reasonable to assume that in offering
Assad asylum Tunisia sought the removal of Assad from the political scene in
order to end the atrocities.
Gilligan makes it clear that in his model no military intervention by the
international community is necessary and deterrence occurs even in the absence
of enforcement power. Gilligan's conclusions about the ICC should make for
very good news to international criminal justice enthusiasts.8" In light of the
78 Tunisia Offers Aylum to BasharAssad, THE INDEPENDENT WORuD NEWS (MIDDLE EAST), (Feb. 28,
2012), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/tunisia-offers-asylum-to-bashar-
assad-7459045.html.
79 See Gilligan, supra note 15, at 935-36 (citing examples of states that offer dictators asylum).
80 Id. at 942-51.
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difficulties inherent in international intervention and compelling state
cooperation, a self-enforcing ICC would be a great addition to the efforts to end
impunity. However, as useful as Gilligan's Model is, especially with regards to
highlighting the important role of self-surrender in the effectiveness of the ICC
regime, it remains incomplete. This is because this model treats the probability
of regime change exogenously (or as a random act determined by Nature) and
fails to take into consideration the effect of the ICC on opposition group
behavior and the prospect of regime change. Consequently, the implicit
assumption in the model is that the operation of the ICC has no bearing on the
actions of opposition groups or in defining their struggle against a government
accused of the commission of atrocities. In reality, however, and because the
ICC prosecutes opposition groups as well as leaders, the operation of the court
restricts opposition groups to the use of acceptable levels of violence that will
not bring the opposition groups themselves under the jurisdiction of the court.
In Section III below, I examine the effect of the ICC on opposition group
behavior to determine whether or not the threat of regime change remains
despite the fact the ICC prosecutes leaders and opposition groups alike.
Be the above as it may, the contributions Gilligan made to the debate are
invaluable. Firstly, he highlighted the central role for self-surrender in the
discussion about the effectiveness of the ICC. Secondly, he suggested a possible
role for plea-bargaining to cover the range of survival probabilities between the
lower level, entailing surrender to the ICC, and the higher level, which will result
in asylum. Building on this insight, Ritter and Wolford develop a bargaining
model to show that the effectiveness of the ICC regime can be enhanced by
offering pre-arrest bargaining to some indicted leaders who are less likely to be
removed from power or individuals who otherwise stand to lose some utility by
staying at large.8 They conclude, however, that this comes at the cost of
incentivizing more crimes in a trade-off between deterrence and the regular
administration of justice." Finally, by making the decision to surrender to the
ICC dependent on prospects for regime survival, Gilligan managed to place the
question of regime change at the heart of the debate. This is a significant
development for the reasons set out in Subsection II.C below.
C. A Note on Regime Change
In addition to the problematic prospects for the enforcement of ICC
warrants, the international criminal justice regime suffers from a number of
81 Emily Hencken Ritter & Scott Wolford, Negotiating Surrender Criminal Courts, Pre-Arrest Bargains,
and the Enforcement of Warrants, 19-21 (May 17, 2010), http://userwww.service.emory.edu/
-ehencke/nonsovereign.pd f.
82 Id. at 19.
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deficiencies that undermine its potential as a freestanding response to political
violence.83 This is particularly the case with respect to internal conflicts that now
inform the majority of situations before the ICC.84 There is indeed a suggestion
that the mere involvement of international criminal institutions, instead of
ameliorating communal violence, intensifies political struggles and complicates
the resolution of structural causes of civil wars.8" In addition, the undue
emphasis on retributive justice and dogged adherence to an agenda of
accountability, regardless of cost, ignores more pressing issues such as
restoration of the social and political order as required to rectify the structural
injustices giving rise to conflict.86 Even though the international criminal justice
regime seeks to consolidate its role as protector of individual rights apart from
the nation-state, the fact that it applies only in limited circumstance and is
enforced both selectively and irregularly makes it an unsuitable vehicle for a
sustainable prevention of political violence." On the other hand, genuine
democratic institutions representing the aspirations of post-conflict societies and
respectful of the rule of law will provide better safeguards against repression.88
For these reasons, it is imperative, at a minimum, that the ICC takes into
consideration its effect on prospects of democratic transitions within countries
experiencing conflict. Otherwise, Newman argues, ignoring domestic political
dynamics is likely to result in the poorest and most vulnerable victims of
atrocities paying a hefty price for international justice.89
An approach to prosecutions that is necessarily subjective in its assessment
of the causes of violence and which pursues violators without critical reflection
may lead the ICC to become complicit in quelling legitimate struggles for
freedom and institutional change while empowering undemocratic and violent
forces.9° Nouwen and Werner argue that the ICC's intervention in internal
conflicts often results in the relegation of one party to political irrelevance while
elevating the opposing party to protector of humanity and upholder of law,
often undeservedly.9" Branch notes that the ICC was widely criticized for its
83 Ruti G. Teitel, Humani's Law: Rule of Law for the New Global Politics, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 355,
371 (2001) (stating that the aim of international criminal law is to end political violence).
84 Akhavan, supra note 29, at 113-14.
85 Sarah M.H. Nouwen & Wouton G. Werner, Doing Justice to the Political- The International Criminal
Court in Uganda and Sudan, 21 EUR. J. INT'L L. 941, 962-65 (2010); Branch, supra note 18, at 194.
86 Branch, supra note 18, at 194-96.
87 Nada Ali, The Role of Democray in International Criminal Law, LIBER AMICORUM; ADAMA DIENG
(provisional book title), (forthcoming Jan. 2014).
88 Id.
89 Newman, supra note 62, at 350-52.
90 Branch, supra note 18, at 194-95.
91 Nouwen & Werner, supra note 85, at 962-63.
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intervention in Uganda because it sided with a known oppressive regime which
has itself been implicated in atrocities.92 He maintains that in agreeing to
adjudicate the case, the ICC legitimized the Ugandan Government's repression
of its political opponents. In addition, by subscribing to the reductive narrative
of "the criminal, the victim, and the transcendental judge," the court practically
consigned the legitimate demands of the LRA, including the end of political
violence, to obscurity.93 While framing of the issues involved in such narrow
confines might reflect the appeal to the "spectacle of courtroom drama, which
pits darkness against the forces of light and reduces the world to a manageable
narrative,"94 it does not easily fit the genre of contemporary internal conflicts
and should not be applied to them as a matter of course.
Branch also argues that institutions such as the ICC create a dependency
on international intervention that undermines the demands for change on a
national level.9" It is this dependency that Mamdani finds undesirable and akin to
obliterating the concept of citizenship in developing countries.96 The assumption
that justice would be restored and freedom will reign after an international court
tries a handful of perpetrators is unreasonable. As John Gray explains in the
context of international humanitarian interventions, "[f]reedom is not... a
primordial human condition: where it exists it is the result of generations of
institution building. 97
In addition to the centrality of regime change to the attainment of a
broader conception of justice that includes political justice,98 there is a more
pragmatic need for the ICC to enable domestic political dynamics seeking
democratic transitions. In light of the ICC enforcement problems, democratic
transitions often provide the only path to accountability. Both the qualitative
accounts of Akhavan99 and Snyder and Vanjamuri' ° allude to the fact that
regime change was essential to securing the arrest of indicted criminals in both
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
92 Branch, supra note 18, at 183-85.
93 Id. at 190.
94 Akhavan, supra note 21, at 30.
95 Branch, supra note 18, at 194.
96 Mahmood Mamdani, Responsibiity to Protect or Right to Punish?, 4 J. INTERVENTION AND
STATEBUILDING 53, 65-67 (2010).
97 JOHN GRAY, BLACK MASS: APOCALYPTIC RELIGION AND THE DEATH OF UTOPIA 110 (2007).
98 Branch, supra note 18, at 193.
99 Akhavan, supra note 21, at 8-9.
100 Snyder & Vanjamuri, supra note 58, at 22-25.
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III. THE MODEL
Whether or not the ICC is successful in deterring leaders is determined by
the extent to which its operation reduces a leader's payoffs from committing
crime. Literature on the topic rightly seeks to incorporate concerns that the ICC
imposes weaker sanctions than sanctions imposed by the opposition when a
successful coup occurs, and can therefore incentivize crime."1 It is indeed one of
the arguments advanced by proponents of the ICC that international
prosecutions keep at bay forces of vengeance in post-conflict societies. 2 In
addition, because of the inherent human rights bias in the international criminal
justice regime, the ceiling on sentencing imposed by the ICC falls far short of
the sentences usually imposed for such crimes in domestic legal systems.'0 3 The
debate surrounding the current struggle for jurisdiction between the ICC and the
Libyan National Transitional Council over the case of Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi is
partly informed by whether the court should surrender jurisdiction to Libyan
courts while knowing that a conviction is likely to result in the death sentence in
accordance with Libyan law.'" As mentioned above, Gilligan posits that it is this
feature of the ICC that renders it a self-enforcing regime in certain cases (See
Figure 1 above). Faced with lower probabilities of survival in office, Gilligan
maintains, leaders will have no option but to surrender to the ICC to receive a
lesser punishment than the severe punishment likely to be imposed by the
opposition after a coup.
05
Using the logic advanced in the game theoretic literature reviewed above, I
developed a game-theoretic model of incomplete information to demonstrate
the possible effects of ICC actions on the behavior of opposition groups, the
intuition being that this may in turn affect a leader's cost-benefit calculus when it
comes to committing crimes. This model is intended to add to the debate on the
ICC's self-enforcement potential as posited by Gilligan." 6 As noted in Section
II.B above, Gilligan's Model remains incomplete as it does not make allowance
for the fact that the ICC sanctions apply equally to leaders and opposition
101 Gilligan, supra note 15, at 937, 943; Ritter & Wolford, supra note 81, at 19-21; Ku & Nzelibe, spra
note 76, at 806 (using empirical evidence to show that autocratic leaders in Africa face harsher
sentences domestically than sentences dealt out by international criminal tribunals).
102 See, for example, Akhavan, supra note 21, at 7-8.
103 Jose E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessonsfrom Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 365, 403-
10 (1999) (discussing the divergence in sentencing between the ICTR and the domestic legal
system in Rwanda).
104 Carsten Stahn, Jibya, the International Criminal Court and Complementariy: A Test for "Shared
Responsinity," 10J. INT'L CRIM.JUST. 325, 346-47 (2012).
105 See Gilligan, supra note 15, at 956-57.
106 Id. at 953.
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groups. This is important because the threat of opposition punishment, which
he advances as the main factor influencing a leader's decision to surrender to the
ICC, may not arise if opposition groups find that in order to affect regime
change, they may be subject to prosecution by the court themselves.
A. Motivation
It is not unreasonable to assume that some opposition/rebel groups may
resort to the commission of crimes against humanity in the face of vicious
attacks by a leader who habitually commits crimes within the jurisdiction of the
ICC.107 This is well demonstrated by the evolving conflict in Syria."0 8 The brutal
repression that accompanied the Syrian Government's response to peaceful
demonstrations calling for political change and which swept the country since
March 2011 led to the inevitable resort to armed resistance by the Syrian
opposition. Pursuant to the first gross violations of human rights by
Government agents and the mounting civilian death toll, the opposition's
demands understandably shifted to total regime change. This spurred on a raging
conflict in the country that has since metamorphosed into a full-blown civil war.
With the Assad Government relentlessly pursuing a scorched-earth policy,
escalating the use of heavy weapons and purposefully attacking civilian
populations," 9 the opposition may have eventually succumbed to the benefits of
visiting atrocities on the other side. 110
There are indeed further examples of rebellions turning sour in addition to
the above. Branch notes that while there is no denying the responsibility of the
Ugandan rebel group the LRA for the most heinous crimes against the Acholi
people in Northern Uganda, the Government of Uganda itself was involved in a
number of massacres, atrocities and forced civilian displacements in the region
107 The analysis in this Article is only concerned with the three core crimes of Genocide, Crimes
against Humanity, and War Crimes as set out in Articles 6-8 of the Rome Statute. The crime of
aggression is excepted because it neither has a negative effect on the exercise of state sovereignty
(it on the contrary guards it), nor does it have a direct effect on internal political dynamics. In
addition, the three former categories of crime under the jurisdiction of the ICC are qualitatively
different in that they seek to enforce standards of international humanitarian law and human
rights law in the face of ill-treatment by a state of its own citizens.
108 INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, Sjfia's Mutating Conflict, The Executive Summary of Crisis Group
Middle East Report No. 128 (Aug. 1, 2012), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/-/media/
Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Syria/128 -syrias-
mutating-conflict.pdf.
109 Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Adopts Text Condemning Violence in Syria,
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between 1991 and 1996.111 He explains that the LRA, before turning against the
same people it sought to represent, had initially pursued legitimate demands that
remain valid today and which included the end of political oppression and
violence as well as the political and economic equality of Southern and Northern
Uganda."2 Keller explains that the conflict in Uganda is typical of intra-state
conflicts in the twenty-first century in which "the insurgent group is incapable of
overthrowing the government, but more than capable of massacring and
mutilating innocent civilians."" 3
A more nuanced example is perhaps provided by the rebellion of the
Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in what used to be Southern Sudan. It
is both widely known and well documented that the SPLA recruited child
soldiers for its military operations and in the process committed a number of
atrocities against civilian populations in the South including abductions.' The
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which was finally concluded between
the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)"5 and the Government of
Sudan in 2005, and which brought to an end one of the longest civil wars in
Africa, makes specific reference to the cessation of hostilities against civilian
populations and the rehabilitation of child soldiers." 6 Even though the crimes
committed by the SPLA are in this respect similar to those for which the
Congolese rebel Lubanga was found guilty by the ICC in what came to be the
court's first verdict," 7 it is easy to see that the SPLA rebellion was in fact
motivated by the need to resist a corrupt regime. After all, short of affecting
regime change and bringing about a New Sudan where political and economic
rights are based on citizenship," 8 the SPLA managed to secure the fundamental
right of self-determination to the people of the South. In the meantime,
Sudanese President Al Bashir remains wanted by the ICC for crimes against
111 Branch, supra note 18, at 180-82.
112 Id. at 191.
113 Linda M. Keller, Achieving Peace nith Justice: The International Criminal Court and Ugandan Alternative
Justice Mechanisms, 23 CONN. J. INT'L L. 209, 211 (2008).
114 Randall Fegley, Comparative Perpectives on the Rehabilitation of Ex-Slaves and Former Child Soldiers with
Special Reference to Sudan, 10 AFRICAN STUD. Q. 35, 36-39 (2008).
115 The SPLM is the political arm of the SPLA.
116 Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities
Between the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the People's Liberation Movement/Sudan
People's Liberation Army (SPLM/SPLA) During the Pre-Interim and the Interim Periods, arts. 5,
24, Sudan-SPLM/A, Dec. 31, 2004 http://www.usip.org/publications/peace-agreements-sudan.
117 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment pursuant to Article
74 of the Statute (Mar. 14, 2012) http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1379838.pdf.
118 Elwathig Kameir, Toward Building the New Sudan, in NEW SUDAN IN THE MAKING?: ESSAYS ON A
NATION IN PAINFUL SEARCH OF ITSELF 17 (Francis M. Deng ed., 2009).
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humanity in Darfur while the government of Sudan continues to employ
similarly vicious tactics in its new conflict in Sudan's South Kordofan region.119
B. Structure of the Game
In order to illustrate the interaction between the leader and the opposition
group in light of the existence of the ICC, a model of incomplete information is
specified that assumes the ICC will indict all crimes falling under its jurisdiction
whether committed by a leader of a particular country or groups opposed to this
leader. To capture this, it is assumed that the ICC will impose a punishment of
(F) with probability (q) in each case. Therefore, a cost of (qF) will be deducted
from the payoffs of a player if the ICC can indict him for crimes he committed.
The uncertainty in the model relates to the ability of opposition groups to win
the fight for control without committing atrocities. The game starts with Nature
(as a non-strategic player) randomly assigning a probability that the opposition
group is one of two types: a weak type that is unable to affect regime change or
win without resorting to the commission of atrocities, and a strong type that is
able to affect regime change without the commission of atrocities. While
opposition groups are able to observe whether they are strong or weak, the
leader is not certain which type of opposition he is facing. To simplify the
model, it is assumed that if the opposition revolts, they will win. 2 ° The setting of
the model comes from the expectation that extreme violence is employed by
weak participants in any given contest. Kalyvas explains that "[t]he persistent use
of indiscriminate violence points to political actors who are fundamentally weak:
this is the case with civil wars in failed states ... where high levels of violence
emerge because no actor has the capacity to set up the sort of administrative
structure required by selective violence., 121
An example of such behavior was recorded in the context of the Nigerian
local elections where violence was found to be used more frequently by political
opponents than by government incumbents already in control. 22
119 Sudan: Crisis Conditions in Southern Kordofan, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 4, 2012), http://www.
hrw.org/news/2012/05/04/sudan-crisis-conditions- southern-kordofan.
120 This is a necessary simplification of the model which causes no loss of generality provided the
assumption: V>0 holds. This assumption will hold if there is a high probability of success for a
rebellion or otherwise the payoffs from being in office are very high compared with not being in
office (See suggestion in Collier, infra note 122, at 39).
121 Nzelibe, supra note 56, at 1187 (quoting STATHIS N. KALYVAS, THE LOGIC OF VIOLENT CIVIL
WAR 171 (2006)).
122 PAUl. COLIER, WARS, GUNS, AND VOTES: DEMOCRACY IN DANGEROUS PLACES 39 (2009).
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C. Players and Their Payoffs
There are two strategic players in the model: (i) a leader (L) who is faced
with the choice between committing crimes falling under the jurisdiction of the
ICC (appears on the model as (C)) or not committing such crimes (appears on
the model as (NC)), and (ii) the opposition (Opp), who has to decide between
mounting a rebellion (appears on the model as (R,) when the opposition is
strong, and (R,) when it is weak) or not mounting a rebellion (appears on the
model as (NRs) when the opposition is strong, and (NR,) when it is weak).' 23
Nature is a non-strategic player randomly assigning the probability (a) that the
opposition is the type that wins only with the commission of atrocities, and
probability (1-a) that the opposition, when it revolts, can topple the government
without committing atrocities. The probability (a) can be interpreted as an
indication of the opposition's political capacity or efficacy to affect regime
change peacefully (with o=O denoting maximum capacity to affect change and
ocl denoting no capacity to affect change), but it can also be an indication of
the strength of the government or its control on the reign of power. As stated in
III.B above, the model assumes that the leader is not privy to the information
regarding opposition type at the time of deciding whether or not to commit
crimes. However, because the opposition is aware of its type, its moves are
predicated on this knowledge.
The extensive form of the one-shot game (See Figures 2 and 3 below)
illustrates the interaction between the two players; firstly, prior to the ICC (Pre
Institution) (Figure 2), and secondly, with the Effects of the ICC (Post
Institution) (Figure 3). Even though the players play consequentially in each
model, with the leader going first, the game unfolds in one time period.
The Payoffs of each player are set out as follows:
Leader Payoffs
The leader receives a payoff of Wcr if he commits a crime falling under the
jurisdiction of the ICC. If, instead, he chooses to respect the Rule of Law and
refrain from committing a crime, he receives a payoff of Wg..' 24 The assumption
123 Please note that it is assumed that the opposition is a unitary actor. This is a reasonable
assumption in so far as the opposition is likely to unite to expel a dictator regardless of ideological
or other differences. An instructive example of this is the unified front of the Darfur rebels
fighting the Government of Sudan, which includes secular movements (the SLA) as well as
Islamist movements (the JEM). See general y, JULIE FLINT & ALEX DE WAAL, DARFUR: A NEW
HISTORY OF A LONG WAR (2d ed. 2008).
124 Please note that the subscript (1g) does not denote the logarithm of W. In this context (lg) is used
to indicate that the source of the leader's payoff (W) is other than from criminal activity (denoted
by the subscript (cr)). (lg) stands for legal.
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in the model is that Wcr is larger than Wig in order to account for the relevance of
the gains from crimes. Simply put, if Wcr is smaller than Wig, there will be no
reason for the leader to consider it as an option. Therefore, in the event there
are no costs to his behavior either way, when a leader chooses to commit crimes
it is because his payoffs from criminal activity are higher than his payoffs from
lawful behavior. With respect to costs, and in the event that the opposition
rebels toppling the leader, the leader suffers either a cost of (d) if he was
overthrown having not committed any crimes, or a cost of (R) if he is
overthrown after he committed atrocities. (R) is assumed to be higher than (d) in
line with the literature in the field. 25
When the ICC is included in the model, the only change in the leader's
payoffs is that he suffers a cost of (qF) whenever he commits a crime and is not
overthrown by the opposition. 26 On the other hand, if a leader commits crimes
and is then toppled, he will not suffer the sanction of the ICC because he will be
punished by the opposition instead.
Opposition Payoffs
It is assumed for simplicity that the opposition strictly prefers to be in
power. Therefore, if the opposition is unable to overthrow the regime and
remains out of office, it receives a payoff of zero. On the other hand, the payoff
for overthrowing the regime is (V). To reflect the internal costs of committing
atrocities, the opposition suffers a cost of (L) that can be regarded as a
legitimacy cost or loss of popular support after the commission of crimes.
When the ICC is included in the model, the only change in the payoffs is
that the opposition suffers a cost of (qF) (in addition to the legitimacy cost (L))
whenever it commits crimes in the process of overthrowing the government, in
other words, whenever it is weak and it rebels. 2 '
125 Gilligan, supra note 15, at 944.
126 Compare payoffs of (L) on the paths {C,NRs} and {C,NRw} on Figure 2 (Pre-institution) and
Figure 3 (Post-institution).
127 Compare payoffs of (Opp) on the paths {a,NC,Rs} and {aC,Rw} on Figure 2 (Pre-institution)
and Figure 3 (Post-institution).
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D. Discussion and Analysis
The flaw in Gilligan's Model is that it ignores the effect of the ICC on
opposition behavior. If the ICC leads opposition leaders to rebel less often, then
the threat of opposition punishment that makes the model work will diminish,
thereby leading to further impunity and more crimes. Subsection III.D.1 below
follows the interaction between a leader and an opposition group before the
institution of the ICC. The effect of the ICC on the behavior of the parties is
then explained in Subsection III.D.2.
Strong Opposition (S)NCIs(i-,V
Can win without atrocities L
Opp ..,.,,.. (Wrl O)
Nature OPP K(Wc,-R, V)
IIRS Opp NRw (W18?O)
Weak Opposition (W) L Rw (W-d, V-L)




1. Prior to the ICC.
Figure 2 above shows that the leader's decision to commit crimes or to act
lawfully will depend on what the opposition is likely to do in the final stage of
the game. Therefore, in order to ascertain a leader's dominant strategy, one must
first determine the opposition's dominant strategy. Knowing the likely course of
action for the opposition, a Leader is then able to choose between the paths of
committing crimes (C) and not committing crimes (NC) based on the payoffs he
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is likely to receive in each case. 2 8 The results below are based on the solution of
the game that appears in Section A of the Annex.
First: Opposition's Dominant Strategy Prior to the ICC
Solving for the opposition's dominant strategy reveals that the only
relevant strategies are (Rs, Rv) and (R, NRW), with the other two strategies strictly
dominated (See Section A of the Annex). This means that the opposition's best
bet is either (i) to revolt in any case; whether it is weak or strong or (ii) to revolt
only when it is strong.
This is logical because a strong opposition is always better off in revolt as it
loses nothing and stands to gain 'being in power' by rebelling. Therefore, the
two strategies that exclude this action on part of a strong opposition (namely:
(NR,, NRW) and (NR,, R,)) are strictly dominated and hence irrelevant.
Whenever V>L, the dominant strategy for the opposition is (R, Rw).129
This means that the opposition will rebel regardless of its type whenever
the gains from rebelling (V) exceed the legitimacy cost (L). A strong opposition
rebels in this case, because it does not suffer any losses by rebelling. A weak
opposition on the other hand, suffers a loss of credibility that is not high enough
to offset the gains from rebelling. Therefore, a weak opposition will also rebel in
this case.
Whenever V<L, the dominant strategy for the opposition is (R, NRw). 30
This means that where the gains from rebelling (V) do not offset the
legitimacy cost (L), only a strong opposition will rebel. Because a strong
opposition does not need to commit any atrocities in order to overthrow the
government, it is not affected by any loss of credibility or legitimacy as a result
of its rebellion. Therefore, its best course of action is always to rebel because
being in office is strictly better than being in the opposition. However, a weak
opposition that stands to lose a great deal of its legitimacy and credibility by the
commission of atrocities will not rebel when such losses outweigh the gains
from being in power.
We can conclude from the above that the dominant strategy for a strong
opposition is always to rebel, while a weak opposition will rebel only when the
loss in credibility resulting from the commission of atrocities is not too large
compared with the benefits from staying in power.
128 Please note that even though the Leader does not know which type opposition he is facing, he is
aware that there are two types.
129 See Section A(2)(a) of the Annex.
130 See Section A(2) (b) of the Annex.
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Second: Leader's Dominant Strategy Prior to the ICC
Based on the above, the leader's behavior can be predicted in accordance
with the following (See Section A (3) (a) and (b) of the Annex):
If V>L, the Leader will not commit atrocities when:
R-d> Wcr-Wg - : Condition (1)
If V<L, the Leader will not commit atrocities when:
(R-d) (1--a)> WcrWg , Condition (2)
Because R-d>(R-d)(1-__), 3 1  Condition (2) is harder to satisfy than
Condition (1).132 Consequently, if the loss of credibility resulting from the
commission of atrocities by the opposition is too large, it will be less costly, and
hence more likely, for the leader to commit crimes. This is because in this case,
the leader will be overthrown and ultimately punished only if the opposition is
strong enough. Otherwise, he can commit atrocities with impunity. Being
subject to severe punishment only with a probability (1--a) makes it less costly
for a Leader to commit crimes.
As can be expected, in the event that all opposition types will rebel or the
Leader is facing a strong opposition (when V>L or (1--a)=l respectively), it is
more likely that a Leader refrains from committing atrocities when lawful
behavior by him results in larger gains compared to the benefits from unlawful
behavior (Wig>Wcr) and when he is certain that no (or minimum) punishment
will be meted by the opposition if he is deposed having not committed any
crimes (d=O or is low). This is in line with the literature in the field.'33 If the
opposition stands to lose much credibility by the commission of atrocities
(V<L), the Leader's decision to commit atrocities will also depend on the
opposition type. The stronger the opposition ((1--) -+ ), the less likely it is that
the leader will commit crimes.
Based on the above, we can conclude that the following variables retain
their relevance to the commission of atrocities by a Leader within the set-up of
the game:
* The gains by leader from lawful behavior (Wig).
* The gains by leader from criminal behavior (Wc
.
131 For O<a-<l. For a=O, the Leader will be facing a strong type (--=l) and (V) will necessarily be
larger than (L) since L=0. Hence, in this case condition (2) becomes identical to condition (1). For
c=1, the Leader will be facing a weak type which will never rebel so long as V<L. Therefore, in
this case Condition (2) becomes: (R-d) (1-1)>Wc,-Wg - =-C:i:>0>Wcr-W :: g >W,,
which is the necessary condition for the Leader to commit a crime absent punishment by the
Opposition or otherwise.
132 And vice versa; it will be easier to overcome the hurdle in Condition (2) necessary for the
commission of crimes, i.e. Wc-Wtg>(R-d) (1-a).
133 See Gilligan, supra note 15, at 947.
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* The punishment likely to be meted out by the opposition to a
criminal leader after he is deposed (R).
* The punishment, if any, likely to be meted out to a leader who
refrains from committing crimes after he is deposed (d); and
* The opposition type (a), but only when the opposition's loss of
credibility following the commission of crimes outweighs its gains
from being in office.
2. The effect of the ICC.
OPP
(w0)
Strong Opposition (S) NC













Figure 3 illustrates the change in players' payoffs when the 1CC is
introduced. Such change will be expected in opposition payoffs whenever it
commits atrocities as well as in leader payoffs when he commits crimes and is
not punished by the opposition, that is, when he commits crimes but the
opposition chooses not to rebel. The ICC's direct effect is the imposition of a
deduction on players' payoffs equal to the value of ICC sanction (F) multiplied
by the probability of the imposition of such sanction (q) as marked on Figure 3
above. Note for example, that a leader stands to suffer the cost of (qF) when he
commits crimes but the opposition chooses not to rebel (on the path
{, C,NRw}), but not when he commits crimes and the opposition revolts,
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topples him and imposes its own sanction (R) (on the path {C, C,Rw}). Also
note, the payoffs of a strong opposition do not change with the institution of
the ICC, because a strong opposition does not need to commit any crimes and is
hence not subject to the ICC sanction.
As with subsection 1II.D.1 above, a leader's decision with respect to the
commission of atrocities is determined by the strategies available to the
opposition. Therefore, to ascertain the direct effect of the ICC on a leader's
decision to commit crimes, the effect on opposition action must be examined
first. Solving for the game reveals that while the opposition's dominant strategies
remain the same as in 3.4.1, the ICC makes it harder for weak opposition groups
to rebel because of the imposition of an added cost of (qF). The results below
are based on the solution of the game that appears in Section B of the Annex.
First: Opposition's Dominant Strategy after the ICC
Similarly to the Pre-institution game in III.D.1 above, solving for the
opposition's dominant strategy reveals that the only relevant strategies for the
opposition after the institution of the ICC remain (Rs, R.) and (Rb, NR.); the
other two strategies being strictly dominated (See Section B of the Annex). The
ICC, however, affects the definition of the conditions that determine which of
these strategies dominates the other given the values of (V) and (L).
Whenever V>L+qF, the dominant strategy for the opposition is (R., R)_ 134
This means that the opposition will rebel regardless of its type whenever
the gains from rebelling (V) exceed not just the legitimacy cost (L) (as was the
case before the ICC135), but also the cost of the ICC sanction (qF).
As can be expected, a strong opposition will not be affected by the
introduction of the ICC because it does not need to commit atrocities and will
therefore not have to bear the additional cost of an ICC sanction. However, a
weak opposition stands to incur the additional cost of the ICC sanction. This
means that in order for a weak opposition to rebel after the institution of the
ICC, the gains from being in office (V) must be large enough to offset not just
the legitimacy costs but also the possibility of imposition of sanction by the ICC.
Whenever V<L+qF, the dominant strategy for the opposition is
(R , Naw). ' 3
As with the case before the ICC, this means that if the gains from rebelling
(V) do not offset the legitimacy cost (L) and the ICC sanction (qF), only a strong
opposition will rebel for the same reasons as before namely:
134 See Section B(2) (a) of Annex.
135 See 2 of the Opposition's Dominant Strategy under III.D.1, supra, at 313.
136 See Section B(2)(b) of Annex.
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Because a strong opposition does not need to commit any atrocities in
order to overthrow the government, it is not affected by any loss of credibility or
any ICC sanction. Therefore, its best course of action is always to rebel because
being in office is strictly better than being in the opposition. However, a weak
opposition that stands to lose a great deal of its legitimacy by the commission of
atrocities as well as be prosecuted by the ICC and imprisoned will not rebel
when such losses outweigh the gains from being in power.
Even though the opposition's dominant strategies remain the same after
the introduction of the ICC, because the threshold condition for opposition rebellion is now
raised from V>L (Figure 2) to V>L+qF (F1gure 3), the ICC makes it less likey for a
weak opposition to rebel This is because a weak opposition will bear not just the
legitimacy cost of having committed the atrocities, but also the ICC sanction.
While some weak opposition groups may still be able to bear these costs
(because their gains (V) will anyway absorb this new cost), a smaller proportion
of weak opposition groups will rebel compared to the case before the ICC,
because some of the groups that would have rebelled before the ICC will not be
able to absorb the additional 1CC sanction.
Second: Leader's Dominant Strategy After the ICC
In order to compare the conditions for non-commission of crimes by the
leader before and after the ICC, the conditions after the ICC can be split as
follows:
Based on the above, the leader's behavior can be predicted in accordance
with the following (See Section B (3) (a) and (b) of the Annex.37):
If V>L+qF, the leader will not commit atrocities whenever:
R-d>WcWtg - Condition (3)
(1) If L<V<L+qF, the leader will not commit atrocities whenever:
(R-d) (l-t)+qF>Wcr-Wig = Condition (4)




137 Please note that the conditions are defined in accordance with two relationships of inequality
between (V) and (L+qF) as set out in Annex B. Splitting the two original conditions into three is
intended to simplify the comparison with the case prior to the institution of the ICC in which the
conditions are defined in accordance with relationships of inequality but between (V) and (L).
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To compare the conditions necessary for lawful behavior by the leader:
Consider 1(a) above:
If (V) is larger than (L+qF) then it is larger than (L). In this case, in order
for the Leader not to commit crimes prior to the institution of the ICC, the
applicable condition was Condition (1). After the ICC, the relevant condition is
Condition (3). But the two conditions are identical. Therefore, whenever the
opposition's gains from being in office absorb both the legitimacy cost and the
ICC sanction, the ICC will have no effect at all on the incentives of the leader to
commit or not commit crimes.
Consider 1 (b)(1) above:
Even though (V) is larger than (L), it is smaller than (L+qF). In this case, in
order for the leader not to commit crimes prior to the institution of the ICC, the
applicable condition is still condition (1). However, after the institution of the
ICC, the relevant condition is now condition (4). If the ICC has a deterrent
effect in this case, Condition (1) must be more stringent than Condition (4). To
guarantee this, (qF) must be larger than (R-d) (See Section B (4) of the Annex
for the relevant calculation). Therefore, in the event opposition's gains from
being in office exceed the legitimacy cost incurred as a result of the commission
of atrocities during rebellion but cannot also absorb the sanction of the court,
the ICC may incentivize leader crimes unless its sanction is equal to or larger
than the net expected opposition punishment (R-d).38
This is logical, because in this case the ICC sanction must be large enough
to compensate for the loss of opposition sanction which, if not for the ICC,
would have accrued in case of a non-strong opposition (where O<a<l).
Consider 1 (b)(2) above:
If (V) is smaller than (L), then it is also smaller than (L+qF). In this case, in
order for the Leader not to commit crimes prior to the institution of the ICC,
the applicable condition was Condition (2). After the ICC, the relevant condition
is now Condition (4). Condition (2) is naturally more stringent than Condition
(4) (Unless ct=O, in which case the two conditions are identical).'39 This is
because before the institution of the ICC, if the gains from rebellion do not
exceed the legitimacy cost associated with the commission of crimes by the
opposition, the threat of opposition punishment depended on opposition type.
The stronger the opposition (the higher (1--a)), the less incentive the leader has
138 Compare condition (1) which is applicable to V>L with Condition (4) which is applicable to
L+qF>V>L. For the ICC to at least not have a negative effect, the following must be true
(R-d)(1--a)+axqF>R-d. This condition is satisfied when qF>R-d (See Section B(4) of Annex for
full solution).
139 Please note that in this case, the condition becomes identical to condition (1) with or without the
ICC.
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to commit the crime. However, with weaker oppositions the leader has a better
chance of committing crimes with impunity since it is too costly for these
groups to rebel. After the institution of the ICC, however, the court acts as a
second watchdog that punishes a Leader for the commission of atrocities when
rebellion does not materialize.
As was the case before the ICC, when the court is in operation and the
opposition is strong, the opposition rebels and punishes the leader regardless of
the legitimacy costs because it does not have to commit atrocities. If, on the
other hand, the opposition is weak and is unable to mount the rebellion because
of the legitimacy costs and the court sanction, the leader does not receive the
opposition sanction. However, in this case, the ICC punishes the Leader thereby
filling in the gap that existed earlier when the rebellion fails to materialize.
As an illustration: Consider that Nature assigns a probability of 0.4 that the
opposition is strong and probability 0.6 that the opposition is weak, the





Despite the effect in (2)(ii) above, the imposition of (qF) as well as
deterring opposition groups from rebelling and punishing a leader also increases
the space within which the Leader has no incentives to commit crimes despite the
uncertainty of rebellion by the opposilion. Even if the gains from being in office (V) are
not large enough, the Leader will be deterred from the commission of crimes
because he now faces the possibility of sanction by the ICC (qF) if the
opposition does not rebel; a sanction that was not available before the institution
of the ICC.
After the institution of the ICC, in addition to the variables identified in
III.D.1 above, the new variable comprising of the probability of 1CC sanction
and its size (qF) emerges as a clear determinant of the behavior of leaders. Given
that the ICC quells weak opposition groups from rebelling, it may incentivize
criminal behavior on the part of a leader unless (qF) is of sufficiently large value
as to compensate for the increased uncertainty caused by the ICC's intervention.
E. Summary of Results
In addition to the variables identified in the literature as affecting a leader's
incentives to commit crimes, the model of incomplete information described in
this Article reveals that a leader's decision to commit atrocities will also depend
on the type of opposition he is facing. This is, however, only true if a weak
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opposition is unable to absorb the legitimacy costs occasioned by the
opposition's own violence. In this case, the more likely that an opposition is able
to mount a rebellion without the commission of atrocities (the stronger the
opposition), the less incentive a Leader has to commit crimes. On the other
hand, the fact that the opposition is always able to absorb the legitimacy costs of
its own commission of atrocities guarantees the best deterrence effect on the
leader. In such a situation, a leader's decision will simply turn on the difference
between the costs he incurs in committing crimes versus the cost of lawful
behavior.1" Therefore, we can conclude that before the ICC, the ability of the
opposition to absorb the cost of its violence was a necessary condition of better
deterrence. Otherwise, the leader's incentive to commit crimes will depend on
the opposition type. The less the need to resort to violence on part of the
opposition (the stronger the opposition), the more likely a leader will be
punished for his crimes and the less incentive he has to commit crimes.
Incorporating the ICC in the model, however, negatively affects the
prospect of weak-opposition rebellion since the ICC raises the cost of rebellion
by imposing a sanction on the opposition for the commission of atrocities. By
dissuading weak opposition groups from rebelling, the ICC enhances leaders'
incentives to commit crimes. However, if a leader is facing a strong opposition
capable of removing him from office, the court will be redundant. The ICC will
also not have any effect on a leader's incentives if a weak opposition is able to
absorb all the costs of rebellion including the additional cost of the ICC
sanction. In this case, the ICC will be equally incapable of affecting the
opposition incentives to commit atrocities, because its sanction is not high
enough to offset the gains from being in office. Therefore, the relatively weak
opposition will commit atrocities to remove the leader and will consequently
punish the Leader as in the case before the ICC, making the ICC redundant.
Because the ICC quells weak opposition groups that are incapable of
absorbing the additional cost of ICC sanction from rebelling, the size and
probability of enforcing the ICC sanction become relevant to the leader's
decision to commit atrocities if he faces a non-strong opposition incapable of
surmounting the cost of rebellion. This is because the ICC sanction must now
compensate for the decrease in certainty of rebellion. In this case, the ICC may
have a deterrent effect, may incentivize crimes, or may be redundant according
to the following:
If the opposition gains are only large enough to offset the opposition's loss
of credibility resulting from the commission of crimes, the ICC will incentivize a
leader to commit atrocities unless the ICC sanction is larger than the difference
140 Because the leader will not commit crimes in the first place unless the gains from their
commission (Wce) are bigger than the gains from lawful behavior (\Vi,).
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between the opposition sanction for lawful behavior and the opposition sanction
unlawful behavior. This is because, in this case, the ICC will prohibit non-strong
opposition groups that would have definitely rebelled before the ICC from
rebelling. While before the ICC, the threat of opposition punishment would
have been certain, the ICC makes it probabilistic depending on opposition type.
Therefore, the ICC sanction must be probable and large enough to compensate
for the loss in certainty of opposition sanction.
If the opposition gains exceed the legitimacy cost but the value of the ICC
sanction is equal to the difference between the opposition sanction for lawful
leader behavior and the opposition sanction for unlawful leader behavior, the
ICC will be redundant.
If the opposition gains are not large enough to offset the opposition's loss
of credibility resulting from the commission of atrocities, the ICC will have a
deterrent effect on the leader. This is because, in this case, the ICC works as an
additional watchdog that can impose punishment on a leader in the event the
opposition is too weak to rebel and impose punishment. This makes it costlier
for the leader to rebel, because in addition to the probability that the opposition
can mount a rebellion without the commission of atrocities and punish the
leader, the Leader has to bear in mind that even if such a scenario is not
possible, the ICC will punish him for the commission of crimes.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
A leader's decision to commit crimes or refrain from the same depends on
a set of variables that pits the gains from lawful behavior against the gains from
unlawful behavior by the executive. Given that a leader is not likely to consider
committing atrocities in the first place unless he stands to gain more from
breaking the law, a leader's choice between the commission of crimes and lawful
behavior turns on the cost to be imposed for either action whether by the
opposition or by an external institution like the ICC. If the punishment meted
out by the opposition to a deposed leader is significantly lower for lawful
behavior and substantially severe for the commission of crimes, a leader will be
more likely to refrain from committing atrocities because of the threat of
punishment. Before the ICC, the credibility of this threat depended only on the
opposition type. While a strong opposition always has an incentive to rebel and
will do so, a weak opposition will only rebel if it can absorb the legitimacy costs
of having itself to commit atrocities in order to overthrow the regime. As
discussed in Section III.A above, the SPLA is a good example of a weak rebel
movement that was willing and able to absorb the legitimacy costs it incurred by
committing atrocities in order to resist the regime in Khartoum.
The ICC affects the prospects of opposition punishment because it
imposes an additional cost on relatively weak opposition groups thereby quelling
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them from rebelling. As is mentioned in Section II.C above, international
criminal law is increasingly applied to regulate the behavior of non-state actors
such as rebel groups. The ICC has been particularly active in this respect with its
prosecutions in both Congo and Uganda concerning rebel groups.' Such rebel
groups will now have to incorporate the cost of possible ICC sanction in their
calculus when deciding whether or not to proceed with a rebellion that may
require the commission of atrocities. Even though some may regard this as a
welcome contribution by the court, the dilemma is that raising the cost of
rebellion for weak opposition groups increases the likelihood of a leader's
avoidance of punishment barring a definite ICC sanction. This also means that
the deterrent effect predicted in Gilligan's model despite, and indeed because of,
the ICC's more lenient sentence will not materialize.
There are three caveats to the above conclusion. Firstly, if the probability
of ICC sanction and its size are high enough to compensate for the increased
uncertainty of rebellion, the ICC will have a deterrent effect on leaders. In this
case, Gilligan's self-enforcing effect will not be needed. Secondly, if the
opposition is weak but is at the same time able to absorb the additional cost of
the ICC sanction, the ICC need not have a deterrent effect on the leader since
he will be punished by the opposition in any event. Finally, if the opposition is
positively strong and can mount a rebellion without the commission of
atrocities, the ICC sanction will not be needed to ensure deterrence since in this
case the leader will be punished by the opposition which will provide sufficient
deterrence. In the second and third scenarios, the ICC can afford to be
redundant with respect to directly deterring the leader from the commission of
crimes, because it will still have a residual deterrent effect on the leader as
predicted by Gilligan's model.
Based on the above, to ensure that the ICC has either a direct deterrent
effect or a residual deterrent effect as predicted by Gilligan's model, policy
makers have three options as follows:
(1) Policy makers can either increase the size of the ICC sanction or ensure
that it is applied more frequently. It would of course be preferable if both these
factors can be positively enhanced in which case the ICC will be more likely to
have a direct deterrent effect on leaders. However, and as mentioned in
Subsection II.B above, there is a thirty-year ceiling to the ICC sanction as
defined by the Rome Statute. In addition, the liberal inclination of international
141 See Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen, Case No.
ICC-02/04-01/05 http://www.icc-cpi.int/en-menus/icc/situations%20and/20cases/situations/
situation%20icc%200204/related/20cases/icc/200204%200105/Pages/uganda.aspx (last visited
Oct. 17, 2013); Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, http://www.
icc-cpi.int/en-menus/icc/situatins%/o20and%/o20cases/situati6ons/situation%20icc% 2 0 0 104/
Pages/situation%20index.aspx (last visited Oct. 17, 2013).
Vol. 14 No. 2
Bringing the Guilo to Jusice
criminal tribunals precludes the adoption of the death penalty as an acceptable
punishment for the commission of atrocities. 4 2 Furthermore, there is no
indication that imposing the higher limit of the ICC sanction will become the
norm. The court recently sentenced Lubanga to fourteen years in prison for
child conscription charges,"4 a sentence equal to the maximum sentence for
burglary in the English criminal law. 1" This leaves only the prospect of ensuring
a more rigorous enforcement of ICC sanctions. However, as discussed in
Subsection II.A above, the ICC faces substantial hurdles to the enforcement of
its warrants that are not likely to abate except at a very high cost to the
international criminal justice project as a whole.
(2) To ensure that a residual deterrent effect of the ICC materializes in
accordance with Gilligan's model, the threat of opposition punishment has to be
credible. One way to do this would be for the court to refrain from prosecuting
rebel groups altogether, or at least reduce both the incidents of their prosecution
and the size of sanction imposed on them in the event of conviction. The
difficulty with this proposition is that even though it may ensure that a leader's
incentives to commit atrocities are not positively enhanced by ICC practices, it
will at the same time encourage the commission of atrocities by rebel groups.
However, the model described in this Article does suggest a third less troubling
prospect for ensuring a deterrent effect for the ICC as set out in (3) below.
(3) Because the ICC can afford not to have a direct deterrent effect if the
leader faces a strong opposition, the court may be able to contribute positively
to the deterrence of leaders if it manages to sufficiently weaken the government
through the use of its indictments. An example of how indictments can be used
to this end is provided by limited literature on game theoretic analysis of
organized crime. Acconcia et al. suggest that the use of indictments targeted
towards mid to lower level members of a criminal organization, coupled with
leniency programs, increases the social good by creating internal conflicts
between members of the organization and enhances the likelihood of conviction
of higher officers.' Provided a similar dynamic is replicable in the international
criminal justice context, the ICC can enhance the chances of opposition groups
to affect regime change without the need to resort to atrocities by destabilizing
142 Alvarez, supra note 103, at 406-7.
143 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on Sentence
pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, 99 (July 10, 2012) http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/
doc/doc1438370.pdf.
144 Theft Act, 1968, c. 60, § 9(4) (U.K.).
145 Antonio Acconcia et al., Accomplice-Witness and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from
Italy, 2 (March 2011) (on file with Cultura dell' integritA nella Pubblica Amministrazione), available
at http://integrita.sspa.it/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/sspapapern4_08031 IAcconcia.pdf.
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corrupt governments. The suggestion that asymmetric leniency could be used to
enhance the enforcement of international criminal law is consistent with the
common perception that offering plea-bargains to lower level perpetrators may
improve the effectiveness of international criminal prosecutions.'46 The obvious
parallels between the two contexts arguably support this position since in both
settings a hierarchical organization engages in opaque criminal conduct that is
widely diffused between its members so that it is often particularly difficult to
implicate the leadership.'47 Provided indictments can be used accordingly,'48 the
ICC will have a residual deterrent effect as predicted by Gilligan, without
encouraging unlawful behavior by opposition groups. In addition, by
empowering opposition groups to remove corrupt leaders, the ICC may
contribute to bringing about a better social and political order capable of
addressing the root causes of internal conflicts.
A residual deterrent effect of the ICC as is predicted by Gilligan is only
possible if the threat of opposition sanction remains credible despite the ICC.
Taking into consideration the effect of the court on weak opposition groups,
this can only follow in practice from sufficiently empowering opposition groups
so that they are able to affect regime change without having to commit
atrocities. Otherwise, and because a non-discriminatory use of prosecutorial
discretion that habitually targets opposition groups creates disincentives for
regime change, the ICC's residual deterrent effect will not materialize. Indeed, if
all the ICC does is to quell weak opposition groups from rebelling, the court
"may end up ... lending support to violent and anti-democratic political
forces.') 1
49
146 See Stephanos Bibas & William W. Burke-White, International Idealism Meets Domestic-Criminal-
Procedure Realism, 59 DUKE L.J. 637, 685-89 (2010) (suggesting that asymmetric plea-bargains be
used to acquire much needed incriminating evidence against high-level officials); Nancy Amoury
Combs, Copping a Plea to Genocide: The Plea Bargaining of International Crimes, 151 U. PA L. REv. 1, 90-
102 (2002) (arguing that international criminal tribunals need to negotiate with low-level officials
in order to attain information because of the rarity of documentary evidence of atrocities); Ralph
Henham & Mark Drumbl, Plea Bargaining at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, 16 CRiM. L. F. 49, 84 (2005) (observing that the guilty pleas rendered regarding the
Srebrenica massacre may have led to the eventual admission of responsibility by Bosnian Serb
leadership).
147 See Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiray Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307,1315-33 (2003) (discussing criminal
group behavior).
148 This is the subject of ongoing research by the author investigating the possible effects of
asymmetric leniency schemes on the incentives of leaders to commit crimes.
149 Branch, supra note 18, at 189.
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V. CONCLUSION
The model developed in this Article seeks to fill a gap in the growing game
theoretic literature dealing with the enforcement problem of the ICC. By taking
into consideration the ICC's effect on opposition groups, it puts to the test the
optimistic pronouncements expressed in this literature regarding a residual
deterrent effect of the ICC despite its lack of enforcement powers. As
compelling as the possibility of a self-enforcing International Criminal Court is,
Gilligan's proposition that the mere existence of the court provides dictators
with a cogent albeit costlier exit strategy is only applicable if the threat of
opposition sanction is credible. However, because the ICC targets leaders and
opposition alike, it will cripple weak oppositions thereby incentivizing more
crimes by those in power.
The existence of the court and its practice of prosecuting non-state actors
for the commission of atrocities, contrary to what Gilligan suggested, may in fact
reduce the probability that a leader who committed atrocities would face the
more punitive sanction of opposition punishment. While the ICC would provide
a second avenue for the punishment of the leader in this case, it does so at a
problematically lower probability of capture and a much lower sanction than
otherwise provided by the opposition. In addition, curbing the activities of the
opposition will necessarily mean higher survival rates for criminal regimes. Even
if the analysis in Gilligan's Model withstands the effect of allowing for ICC
punishment of the opposition, the court's insistence on non-discriminatory
prosecutions will result in lower probabilities of regime change and therefore
lower incentives to surrender to the ICC or indeed request asylum. It is indeed
regrettable that Gilligan paid as insufficient attention to the issue of democratic
transition as is traditionally bestowed on it by international criminal justice
literature. By treating the probability of regime survival as exogenous to the 1CC
regime, he circumvented the question of how the ICC can contribute to
addressing the root causes of political and civil strife in places like the African
continent.
Be the above as it may, the Model presented in this Article does suggest a
possible deterrent effect of the ICC despite its negative impact on the activities
of relatively weak opposition groups. In the event the ICC indictments can be
utilized to weaken the grip of a criminal government on the reign of power to
the extent of enabling the opposition to successfully affect a regime change
without the need to commit atrocities, the ICC will have a deterrent effect. By
lending support to internal political dynamics that seek political transformation
along democratic lines, the ICC can also contribute to addressing the root causes
of internal conflicts. Even though the issue of democratic transition in post-
conflict societies often receives peripheral treatment in international criminal
justice discourse, if the impact of the ICC on domestic political movements is
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not sufficiently understood, the court will end up empowering the same
individuals it is attempting to combat.
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ANNEX
A. Solution of the Game in Section III.D.1 "Before the ICC"
In order to ascertain the opposition's dominant strategy and consequently
the leader's dominant strategy in the game prior to the institution of the ICC, I
use the normal form of the game set out in Table 1 below, which corresponds to
the game in Figure 2.
TABLE 1. Normal Form Game Prior to ICC
Leader Opposition Rs, Rw NRs, NRw Rs, NR NRs, Rw
Strategies Strate *es
C \V,-R, V-aL Wr0(1-a)R, W ccR,im /(1--a)V c{(V-L)
NC \ig-d, V-L Wig, 0 Wig(1--)d, Wig-ad,
The matrix in Table 1 above shows opposition payoffs and leader's payoffs
for the Pre-institution game in Figure 2. Please note:
1. If 0<cx<1:
(a) V--L> oc(V-L) and(b) (1---a)V>0.
Consequently, the strategies (NR, NRW) and (NRS, Rw) are strictly
dominated by the strategies (Rh, R.) and (Rb, NRw).
Therefore, the only relevant strategies for the opposition are
(R, Rw) and (Rb, NRw).
2. To determine which of these strategies dominates the other, we must
solve for the condition that makes it dominant. Hence:





(b) (Rs, NRw,) is the dominant strategy if the following is true:(V -L)<V (-a
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3. Based on the above, if the leader's dominant strategy is to be (NC, NC)
(the non-commission of crimes) the following must be true:
(a) Where V>L,
Wig-d>Wc,-R
R-d>Wc-Wig Z Condition (1)
(b) Where V<L,Wlg-( -)d>Wc - (I -)R
(1 -c) t-(1---) d >WcrWg
(R-d) (1--a)>WcrWig , - Condition (2)
Note that where O<oc<1, R-d>(R-d)(1--).
Therefore Condition (1) is easier to satisfy than Condition (2).
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B. Solution of the Game in Section III.D.2 "After the ICC"
In order to ascertain the opposition's dominant strategy and consequently
the leader's dominant strategy in the game after to the institution of the ICC, I
use the normal form of the game set out in Table 2 below, which corresponds to
the game in Figure 3.
TABLE 2. Normal Form Game Post-ICC
LeaderZ [Opposition Rs, Rw NRs, NRv Rs NRw NRs RIVStrategic Strate "es ,\
C Wcr-R, Wc,-qF, 0 Wc,-(1--a) Wcr-(1--a)qF--aR,
V-,x(L+qF) R--,aqF, -(V-L-qF)
(1-a)V
NC Wig-d, Wig, 0 Wig-(l--a)d, Wig-cd,
V-4LqP) -a)V ax(V-L-qF)
The matrix in Table 2 above shows opposition payoffs and leader's payoffs
for the Post-institution game in Figure 3. Please note:
1 . If 0<0C<1:
(a) V--* (L+qF)>cc(V-L-qF) and
(b) (1-cz)V>O
Consequently, the strategies (NRS, NRw) and (NRS, Rw) are strictly
dominated by the strategies (R, Rw) and (R, NRW). Therefore, the only
relevant strategies for the opposition are (Rs, Rw) and (R, NRW).
2. To determine which of these strategies dominates the other, we must
solve for the condition that makes it dominant. Hence:
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c V<oc(L+qF)
V<L+qF
3. Based on the above, if the Leader's dominant strategy is to be (NC, NC)
(the non-commission of crimes) the following must be true:
(a) Where V>L+qF,
Wig-d>WcR
R-d> WcrWig Condition (3)
(b) Where V<L+qF,
WI9(1--oc)d>W,€(1--ox R-aqF
(l-a) R-(1--) d+ qF>Wcr-Wg
(R-d) (1--a)+0qF>W,--Wig , Condition (4)
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